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1. Introduction 
Undergraduate textbooks typically define evolution as change in gene frequency1.  This 
reflects the conventional view of natural selection and the conventional view of 
heredity. Natural selection occurs because individuals vary, some of these variations 
are linked to differences in fitness, and some of those variants are heritable (Lewontin 
1970). Because variants that are not heritable cannot play a role in natural selection, 
and because the mechanism of inheritance is presumed to b  gen tic, evolution is 
defined as change in gene frequencies. In the 1960s and 1970s this gene-centered 
vision of inheritance was extended to yield a gene-center d view of selection (Williams 
1966, Dawkins 1976). According to gene-selectionism, the fact that individual genes 
are integrated into larger units, from genetic modules to entire phenotypes, is merely a 
special case of the fact that the fitness of any evolutionary unit is a function of the 
environment in which it happens to find itself (Sterelny and Kitcher, 1988). The study 
of development and the study of how phenotypes are integrated are thus doubly 
divorced from the study of evolution. First, all causal factors in the development of the 
phenotype other than genes are excluded as potential sources of evolutionary change. 
Second, the study of development and phenotypic integration cease to be possible 
sources of theoretical insight into the evolutionary process. The phenotypes to which 
an individual gene contributes and the developmental process s by which it makes that 
contribution are simply environmental factors like rainfall or predator density. The 
distribution of each individual allele across these environmental parameters determines 
the fitness of that allele. As far a theoretical population genetics is concerned, 
developmental biology and the nature of complex phenotypes are part of ecology and 
can be adequately represented by the varying fitness values of competing alleles. 
Insights into how organisms develop and how their phenotypes decompose into 
meaningful units do not yield any general insight into evolutionary dynamics, although, 
naturally, to understand the particular selective pressures on particular gene-lineages it 
will be necessary to study their ‘ecology’. 
 
The rapid advance of m lecular developmental biology and the emergence of the new 
field of evolutionary developmental biology (EDB) has done a great deal to counter 
the atomistic approach to organisms and their evolution represented by gene-
selectionism. It is now widely accepted that a meaningful decomposition of the 
organism – or its genome - into parts that can be considered to have their own 
evolutionary history must reflect an understanding of the developmental biology of the 
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organism. This has led to renewed attention to the concept of homology and extensive 
research on the newer concept of developmental modularity (Hall 1992; Hall 1994; 
Raff 1996; Arthur 1997; Wagner 2001). However, most evolutionary developmental 
biologists still accept that the developmental systems they study emerge from 
combinations of genes and genes alone. Jason Robert, Brian Hall and Wendy Olson 
have noted that, “EBD… continues to show a tendency toward reductionism and 
gene-centrism; developmental mechanisms are ultimately genetic…and there is no such
thing as epigenetic inheritance (Robert, et al 2000, 959). In contrast, Developmental 
Systems Theory (DST)2 questions both elements of the gene-c nt r d perspective, 
integrating an emphasis on the relevance of development to evolution with an emphasis 
on the evolutionary potential of extra-genetic inheritance. The result is an account of 
evolution in which the fundamental unit that undergoes natural selection is neither the 
individual gene nor the phenotype, but the life cycle generated through the interaction 
of a developing organism with its environment. In our usage, the ‘developmental 
system’ is the whole matrix of resources that interacts to reconstruct that life cycle. 
 
2. Inheritance 
An organism inherits more than its nuclear DNA. A viable egg cell must contain a 
variety of membranes, both for its own viability as a cell and to act as templates for the 
assembly of proteins synthesized from the DNA into new membrane. A eukaryote cell 
must contain a number of organelles, such as mitochondria, with their own distinctive 
DNA. But the full variety of the contents of the cell is only now being uncovered. For 
normal gene transcription to occur, DNA must be accompanied by the elements of the 
chromatin marking system. For normal differentiation of the embryo, initial 
cytoplasmic chemical gradients must be set up within the cell. The essential role of still 
further parts of the package, such as microtubule organizing centers is becoming 
apparent. But unpacking the inherited resources in the cell is not the end of u packing 
inheritance. In multi-cellular organisms the parental generation typically contributes 
extra-cellular resources. An ant in a brood cell is exposed to a variety of chemical 
influences that lead it to develop as a worker, a queen or a soldier. A termite inherits a 
population of gut endosymbionts by coprophagy. In viviparous organisms the 
environment of the womb provides not only nutrition but a range of stimulation 
essential for the normal development of the nervous system (for examples, see Gottlieb 
1992, 1997, 2001). This stimulation continues after birth. The effects of severe 
deprivation of conspecific stimulation in infant primates, including humans, has been 
well documented (Harlow 1962, Money 1992).  Nor are these effects confined to 
animals. Many eucalypt species have seeds that cannot germinate until they have been 
scorched by a bushfire. For eucalypts to increase the frequency of bushfires to the 
point where this system works reliably, local populations of trees must create forests 
scatered with resinous litter and hung with bark ribbons. These are carried aloft by the 
updraft as blazing torches and spread the fire to new areas (Mount 1964). Even after 
the resources created by the population as a whole are added in, a range of other 
factors must be present before the sum of the available resources adds up to a viable 
package. Development frequently requires gravity or sunlight or, for a hermit crab, a 
supply of discarded shells. These factors are unaffected by the activities of past 
generations of the species that rely on them. Nevertheless, the organism must position 
itself so that these factors interact with it and play their usual role in development. 
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While the evolving lineage cannot make these resources, it can still make them part of 
its developmental system. 
 
It is uncontroversial to describe all these resources as playing a role in development. 
But it is highly controversial to say that these same resources are 'inherited'. With the 
exception of genes, and more recently the chromatin ma king system, their roles are 
not supposed to extend to the intergenerational processes of evolution. Non-g netic 
factors, it is generally supposed, do not have the capacity for replication through many 
generations, and lack the potential to produce the kind of variation upon which natural 
selection can act: “The special status of genetic factors is deserved for one reason only: 
genetic factors replicate themselves, blemishes and all, but non-genetic factors do not.” 
(Dawkins 1982, p. 99). Or, more bluntly: “Differences due to nature are likely to be 
inherited whereas those due to nurture are not; evolutionary changes are changes in 
nature, not nurture.” (Maynard Smith 2000). The continued popularity of this 
argument is puzzling. Many non-genetic resources are reliably passed on across the 
generations. Variations in these resources can be passed on, causing changes in the life 
cycle of the next generation (Jablonka and Lamb 1995; Avital and Jablonka 2001). The 
concept of inheritance is used to explain the st bility of biological form from one 
generation to the next. In line with this theoretical role, DST applies the concept of 
inheritance to any resource that is reliably present in successive generations, and is part 
of the explanation of why each generation r sembles the last. This seems to us a 
principled efinition of inheritance. It allows us to assess the evolutionary potential of 
various forms of inheritance empirically, rather than immediately excluding everything 
but genes and a few fashionable extras. 
 
3. Natural selection 
Armed with a thoroughly epigenetic view of development and an expanded view of 
inheritance, let us now turn to the concept of natural selection. In principle, there 
seems no reason why this concept should not be de-coupled from gene-centered 
theories of development and evolution. After all, Darwin developed the theory of 
natural selection prior to the mechanisms of inheritance being discovered. The three 
requirements for natural selection (variation, fitness differences, heritability) are 
agnostic about the details of inheritance. In Daniel Lehrman’s classic phrase, 'Nature 
selects for outcomes' (Lehrman 1970, p. 28) and the developmental routes by which 
differences are produced do not matter as long as the differences reliably reoc ur. 
Consider the following two cases: Newcomb et al. (1997) found that a single 
nucleotide change in blowflies can change the amino acid at an active site of an enzyme 
(carboxylesterase). This change produced a qualitatively different enzyme 
(organophosphorous hydrolase), which conferred resistance against certain 
insecticides. This case fulfills the three requirements for natural selection. There are 
phenotypic differences in insecticide resistance, these differences are likely to produce 
differences in fitness, and these differences are heritable. Moran and Baumann (1994) 
discuss a similar, fascinating example of evolution in action. Certain aphid species 
reliably pass on their endosymbiotic Buchnera bacteria from the maternal symbiont 
mass to either the eggs or developing embryo. The bacteria enable their aphid hosts to 
utilize what would otherwise be nutritionally unsuitable host plants. Aphids that have 
been treated with antibiotics to eliminate the bacteria are stunted in growth, 
reproductively sterile, and die prematurely. A lineage that inherits bacteria is clearly at 
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an advantage over one that does not. Once again there is variation (lineages with either 
different Buchnera bacteria or without B chnera), these differences confer differences 
in fitness, and they are heritable. All biologists would recognize the first case as an 
example of natural selection in action, but they would probably balk at categorizing the 
aphid/bacteria system in the same way. Yet why should these cases be treated 
differently when both meet the three criteria for natural selection?  
 
An obvious response would be to claim that if there is selection in this case then it can 
be reduced to selection of genetic differences. Aphids with genes for passing on their 
endosymbionts have e olved by outcompeting aphids with genes for not passing on 
endosymbionts. However, it is possible to have differential reproduction of the 
aphid/bacteria system without any genetic difference between the two lineages 
involved. An aphid lineage that loses its bacteria will produce offspring without 
bacteria. These offspring remains genetically identical to the lineages with which they 
compete, but have a lower expected reproductive output. A naturally occurring 
instance of this sort of selectively relevant non-ge etic variation is found in the North 
American fire ant Solenopsis invicta (Keller & Ross 1993).  Colonies containing large, 
monogynous queens and colonies containing small, polygynous queens were shown to 
have no significant genetic differences.   Diff rences between queens are induced by 
the type of colony in which they have been raised, as shown by cross-f stering 
experiments. Exposure of eggs from either type of colony to the pheremonal 'culture' 
of a polygynous colony produces small queens who fou d polygynous colonies, 
leading to more small queens, and so forth. Exposure of eggs from either type of 
colony to the pheremonal 'culture' of a monogynous colony produces large queens who 
found monogynous colonies, leading to more large queens, and so forth. What appears 
to happen here is that a 'mutation' in a non-genetic element of the developmental 
matrix can induce a new self-replicating variant of the system that may differ in fitness 
from the original. 
 
The moral that proponents of DST draw from the c parison of these cases is that the 
power of selective explanations need not be limited to genetic changes. The range of 
phenomena that can be given selective explanation should be expanded to include 
differences dependent upon chromatin marking systems (Jablonka, 2001), prions 
(Lindquist 1997, Lansbury 1997), dietary cues in maternal milk, cultural traditions and 
ecological inheritance (Gray 1992, Laland et al. 2001). Selection for differences in one 
of these heritable developmental resources is likely to have consequences for other 
aspects of the developmental system. Whitehead (1998) has argued that cultural 
selection has led to genetic changes in this way. He observed that in species of whales 
with matrilineal social systems mitochondrial DNA diversity is ten times lower than in 
those with non matrilineal social systems. He suggested that differences in maternally 
transmitted cultural traits, such as vocalizations and feeding methods, have conferred a 
sufficient advantage to lead to the spread of som maternal lineages, and thus their 
mtDNA. The mtDNA that exists today remains because it hitchhiked along with the 
cultural traits that were selected for. 
 
At this point orthodox gene-c tered biologists might concede that natural selection 
can be indeed be generalized to cover cases of expanded inheritance. Having made this 
concession they might then attempt to minimize its significance. We now turn to 
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discuss some well-known strategies for marginalizing the role of expanded inheritance 
in evolution and argue that they are unsuccessful. 
3.1 Only genes contain developmental information 
Genes are widely believed to contain a program that guides development and to 
contain information about the evolved traits of the organism. Perhaps the best known-
aspect of DST is the rejection of this claim in Susan Oyama’s book The Ontogeny of 
Information  (Oyama 1985/2001).  The obvious way to explicate information talk in 
biology is via information theory. In the mathematical theory of information as a 
quantity (Shannon & Weaver 1949) and its semantic relatives (Dretske 1981), a signal 
sender conveys information to a receiver when the state of the receiver is correlated 
with the state of the sender. The conditions under which this correlation exists 
constitute a 'channel' between sender and receiver. Changes in the channel affect which 
state of the receiver corresponds to which state of the sender.  The information 
conveyed by a particular state of the receiver is as much a function of the channel, the 
context, as it is of the sender.  In the case of development, the genes are normally 
taken to be the source, the life cycle of the organism is the signal and the channel 
conditions are all the other developmental resources needed for the life-cycle to unfold.  
But it is a fundamental feature of information theory that the role of source and 
channel condition can be reversed. A source/channel distinction is imposed on a causal 
system by an observer. The source is merely the channel condition whose current state 
the signal is being used to investigate.  If all other resources are held constant, a life 
cycle can give us information about the genes, but if the genes are held constant, a life 
cycle can give us information about whichever other resource we decided to let vary. 
This fact is exploited whenever a biologist uses a clonal population to measure the 
effects of some aspect of the environment. Thus, so far as information theory and its 
relatives are concerned, every resource whose state affects development is a source of 
developmental information (Gray 1992, 2001; Griffiths & Gray 1994; Griffiths 2001; 
Johnston 1987). 
 
A common response to the fact that genes and other physical causes are equally good 
sources of developmental information has been to look for a more demanding notion of 
information that allows the traditional distinction to be drawn. Several biologists and 
philosophers have suggested that ‘teleosemantic’ information can play this role. 
Teoelosemantics is a proposal originating in the philosophy of language to find a place 
in the material world for ‘meaning’ in the sense that human thoughts and utterances 
have meaning. The teleosemantic approach reduces meaning to teleology and then 
reduces teleology to natural selection in the usual manner: the purpose of a biological 
entity is the outcome for which it is an adaptation (Pittendrigh 1958). John Maynard 
Smith has offered one such teleosemantic account of biological information (Maynard-
Smith 2001). He compares natural selection to computer programming using the 
'genetic algorithm' technique. The genetic algorithm programmer randomly varies the 
code of a computer program and selects variants for their performance. In the same 
way, natural selection randomly varies the genes of organisms and selects those 
organisms for their fitness. Just as the purpose of the final computer program is to 
perform the task for which it was selected, the biological purpose of successful genes 
is to produce the developmental outcomes in virtue of which they were selected. This 
biological purpose constitutes the teleosemantic meaning of the gene. For example, the 
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defective haemoglobin gene in some human populations that has been selected because 
it confers resistance to malaria, carries teleosemantic information about malaria 
resistance. 
 
Unfortunately, teleosemantic information is fundamentally unsuited to the aim of 
avoiding parity between genes and other developmental causes. Extra-genetic 
inheritance systems of the various kinds discussed above are designed by natural 
selection to cause developmental outcomes in offsprings. So all forms of extra-genetic 
inheritance transmit teleosemantic information about development. The most fully 
developed teleosemantic account of developmental information is the 'extended 
replicator theory' (Sterelny, Dickison et al. 1996; Sterelny 2000), which recognizes 
from the outset that teleosemantic information exists in both genetic replicators and in 
at least some extra-genetic replicators. Griffiths and Gray (1997) have argued that 
teleosemantic information is carried by all the material traces that play a role in 
inheritance in the extended sense defined above.  
 
In conclusion, while many concepts of information can be applied to the role of genes 
in development, it appears unlikely that any of these captures the intuition that genes 
supply information and other developmental causes do not. The various senses in 
which genes ‘code for’ phenotypic traits, ‘program’ development, or contain 
developmental ‘information’ can be equally well applied to other factors required for 
development. This is not to say, of course, that there is no difference between the 
actual role of genes in development and the roles of membrane templates or host 
imprinting. Genes play a unique role in templating for proteins and a disti ct role as 
nodes in the causal networks regulating cell metabolism. The point is that these 
empirical differences between the role of DNA and that of other inherited 
developmental factors do not imply the metaphysical distinction between ‘form’ and 
‘matter’ that is often inferred from them (Griffiths and Knight 1998). The concept of 
information does not supply the missing link between these empirical differences and 
the conclusion that only genetic change is of evolutionary significance 
 
3.2 Extragen tic inheritance systems have limited evolutionary potential 
Maynard Smith and Szathmary have introduced a distinction between 'limited' and 
'unlimited' systems of heredity (Maynard Smith & Szathmary 1995). They argue that it 
distinguishes genes and languages from all other forms of heredity. Most non-genetic 
inheritance systems, they argue, can only mutate between a limited number of states. In 
contrast, they note that the genome and language both have recursive, hierarchical 
structures, and hence an indefin te number of possible heritable states. This unlimited 
range of combinatorial possibilities enables microevolutionary change and cumulative 
selection to take place. These points are all perfectly legitimate, but from a 
developmental systems perspective the significance of unlimited inheritance should not 
be oversold for three reasons. 
 
First, the unlimited nature of an inheritance system is a property of the developmental 
system as a whole, not only of the resource in which we find the recursive structu. 
The vast coding potential of genes, language and perhaps pheromones is created by the 
way in which combinations of these factors 'mean something' to the rest of the 
 7
developmental system. Asking if a system is limited or unlimited holds the current 
developmental system fixed, and asks what can be achieved by ringing the changes on 
one of the existing developmental resources. But the lesson of the major evolutionary 
transitions - the introduction of whole new levels of biological order such as 
multicellularity - is that evolution can change developmental systems so as to massively 
expand the possible significance of existing developmental resources. A base pair 
substitution in a multi-cellular organism has potentials that it lacked in a unicellular 
ancestor. If it occurs in a regulatory gene it could mean a new body plan. The role of 
systems of 'limited heredity' in these evolutionary transitions is considerable, as 
Maynard-Smith and Szathmary themselves have made clear. 
 
Second, from a selectionist viewpoint the combinatorial richness of an inheritance 
system must be measured in terms of the number of different phenotypic effects, not 
just the number of combinations of components. If the rest of the developmental 
system were such that the indefinitely many base-p ir combinations of DNA collapsed 
into only a few developmental outcomes, then for all its combinatorial structure DNA 
would not be an unlimited heredity system. It not hard to imagine cellular machinery 
with this result, as the existing genetic code is substantially redundant in just this way: 
several codons produce the same amino acid. Hence ‘unlimitedness’ is a property of 
the developmental system as a whole, not of one of its components. 
  
A third and final reason not to place too much emphasis on the lim ted/unlimited 
distinction is that it treats genetic and extragenetic inheritance as if they acted 
separately. This is manifestly not the case. Adding one form of inheritance to another 
causes a multiplication of evolutionary possibilities, not just an addition to them. 
Extragenetic inheritance expands the set of possible heritable combinations, rather than 
merely offering a supplement to it set. Moreover, it makes accessible possibilities that 
would not be accessible to genetic inheritance acting alone. O e of the distorting 
effects of gene-c ntrism is that it forces biologists who are interested in the 
evolutionary potential of extra-genetic inheritance to focus on the rare cases in which 
extra-genetic inheritance is relatively decoupled from genetic inheritance (as in the case 
of Solenposis invicta described above). This is because when genetic and extra-genetic 
inheritance act in conjunction with one another, the extra-genetic element is inevitably 
treated as a mere agent or assistant of the genetic el m t.  But it is evident that the 
real importance of extra-genetic inheritance lies in the contribution it makes to the 
multi-faceted system which, as a whole, generates the heritable variation on which 
evolution acts. 
3.3 Epigenetic Potential and Epigenetic Processes 
As noted above, current work in evolutionary developmental biology (EDB) retains 
the traditional idea that the developmental system of an organism emerges from its 
genes, with the environment acting only as some kind of background or enabling 
cause. In a recent comparison of the ideas of EDB and DST, Jason Robert, Brian Hall 
and Wendy Olson use a distinction between the actual units of inheritance with 
epigenetic potential and the epigenetic processes to which these in an attempt to 
explain why EBD remains more focused on the genetic material (Robert et al 2001). 
They suggest that, at least one, ‘hard’ version of EDB ‘identifies the gene (defined as 
the actual genetic material) as the sole unit of inheritance’ (p 960). The difference 
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betwen EDB and DST, they suggest, is that EDB regards development as the 
expression of epigenetic potentials of genes in an environment, whereas DST regards 
development itself - pigenetic processes - as if they were passed on from one 
generation to the next: ‘Developmental systems theorists...define inheritance as the 
reliable reconstruction of interactive causal networks’ (p 961). Robert et al also 
suggest that, where DST sees aspects of the environment being passed on from one 
generation to the next, EBD sees the control of development in the next generation by 
genes from the previous generation which act via those aspects of the environment - a 
sort of ‘extended genotype’ (p 961).  
 
As one might expect in an article entitled ‘Bridging the gap between Developmental
Systems Theory and Evolutionary Developmental Biology’, Robert et al are concerned 
to show that the two views of inheritance just described are often only two ways to 
describe the very same biological phenomena. We do not think that DST and EDB are 
best compared in this way. DST is not an alternative way of conceptualizing the same 
phenomenon, but a challenge to different aspects of conventional, gene-c tered 
thought. DST accepts the important theoretical advances of EBD but calls for other 
changes to theory that have not to date been part of EDB. Robert et al are on the right 
track, we think, when they compare DST to Scott Gilbert’s call for EDB to embrace 
the role of the environment in development and forge an ‘ecological developmental 
biology’ (Gilbert 2000, and see fn. 2).  
 
Understandably, Robert et al’s attempt to treat DST as an alternative approach to the 
focal questions of EDB leads them to misinterpret DST. The alternative picture of 
inheritance they identify is an interesting one, but it is ot the view outlined in 
canonical presentations of DST (e.g. Oyama et al 2001). The units of inheritance in 
DST are entities with epigenetic potential and not epigenetic processes, just like those 
of EDB. The units of inheritance are developmental resources that reliably reoccur in 
each generation and interact with the other resources to reproduce the life cycle. The 
difference is that DST identifies more things with epigenetic potential than does (hard) 
EBD. Some of these were briefly described above: membrane t mplates, chemical 
gradients in the egg, microtubule organizing centers, embosymbionts, hosts and 
habitats on which organisms are imprinted or with which they are passively 
biogeographically associated, the environment of the hive in insects with castes, 
cultural traditions, and constructed features of a niche such the acidity of the soil in a 
pine forest or the periodicity of fire in a eucalypt forest. There are important 
distinctions between these developmental resources. Some, but not all, are the 
immediate causal consequence of the expression of maternal genes. Some, but not all, 
are actively reproduced, either by the parents of the developing organism or by the 
wider population. The property all these resources share, and in terms of which we 
defined inheritance above, is that they are reliably present in each generation and 
causally necessary for the production of the life cycle of the evolutionary lineage. It is 
an important empirical question whether and to what extent the inheritance of 
variation in each of these resources has the potential to drive evolutionary change (for 
a overview of this question, see Sterelny 2001). A broad, principled definition of 
inheritance leaves this empirical question open for investigation, rather than prejudging 
it. Eva Jablonka and Marion Lamb make the same comment in their recent reply to 
Robert, Hall and Olson: “It seems to us that refusing to call the transmission of non-
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DNA variations inheritance precludes a discussion of the evolutionary effects of the 
consequences of such transmission.” (Jablonka and Lamb 2002, p. 291) 
 
4. Adaptation and niche construction 
The broadest form of extragenetic inheritance is the effect of niche construction on 
future generations. The idea of niche construction finds its ultimate origin in three 
seminal papers in which Richard Lewontin criticized the metaphors that have 
traditionally used to represent the process of adaptation by natural selection 
(Lewontin, 1982; Lewontin, 1983a; Lewontin, 1983b). The metaphorical conception 
that Lewontin criticized is the so-called 'lock and key' model of adaptation. 
Adaptations are solutions (keys) to the problems posed by the environment (locks). 
Organisms are said to be adapted to their ways of life because they were made to fit 
those ways of life. In place of the traditional metaphor of adaptation as 'fit' Lewontin 
suggested a metaphor of construction. Organisms and their ecological niches are co-
constructing and co-defining. Organism's both physically shape their environments and 
determine which factors in the external environment are relevant to their evolution, 
thus assembling such factors into what we describe as their niche. Organisms are 
adapted to their ways of life because organisms and their way of life were made for 
(and by) each other. Lewontin also revised the popular metaphor of a 'fitness 
landscape'. In this image, populations occupy a rugged landscape with many fitness 
peaks and evolve by always trying to walk uphill. But because organisms construct 
their niches, the landscape is ctually much like the surface of a trampoline. As 
organisms climb the hills they change the shape of the landscape. Lewontin’s metaphor 
of construction is not merely a new way to describe the same evolutionary process. It 
is the public face of a substantially revised model of the actual process of natural 
selection, redefining the causal relationships that ecology and evolutionary biology 
must seek to model.  
 
The most detailed attempt to develop the new metaphor of construction is that of F. J. 
Odling-Smee and his collaborators (for a brief overview, see Laland et al. 2001). The 
current prominence of the term 'niche-co struction' is due to this group. The first two 
columns in Table 1 give the traditional model of adaptation as 'fit' and the model of 
adaptation as construction as these two models are described by Lewontin. In the 
conventional picture, change in organisms over time is a function of the state of the 
organism and its environment at each the previous instant. The environment acts on the 
existing state of organisms by selecting from the pool of variation those individuals 
best fitted to the environment. The environment itself changes over time too, but as the 
bottom equation shows, these changes are not a function of what organisms are doing 
at each previous instant. In Lewontin's alternative picture, shown in the center column 
of Table 1., organisms and their environments play reciprocal roles in each other's 
change. Change in the environment over time is a function of the state at each previous 
instant of both the environment and the organisms evolving in that environment.  
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Traditional neo-Darwinism Lewontin's constructionism Odling-Smee's general 
coevolution 
dO/dt = f(O,E) 
dE/dt = g (E) 
 
 
dO/dt = f(O,E) 
dE/dt = g(O,E) 
dOpop/dt = f(Opop,Epop) 
dEpop/dt = g(Opop,Epop) 
d(Opop,Epop)/dt = h(Opop,E) 
 
Table 1. Three pictures of the dynamical equations for evolution. E = Environment, O 
= organism, Epop = organism-referent environment of a population. Opop = 
population of organisms. These variables are re ated by functions f,g,h. See text for 
explanation. 
 
The right hand column of Table 1 shows Odling-Smee's model of evolution as the co-
construction of organism and environment (Odling-Smee 1988). Odling-Smee's 
‘general coevolutionary model’ differs from Lewontin's in two ways. First, Odling-
Smee hoped to generate a common framework in which to represent both development 
and evolution. This explains why the terms Epop and Opop occur in the equations in 
Table 1. Evolution is a process in which populations and their environments co-
construct one another over time. If the terms were Ei and Oi then in Odling-Smee's 
notation the equations would describe the co-construction of an individual organism 
and it's developmental environment as the organism's life cycle unfo ds. By introducing 
these indices Odling-Smee is making explicit what was already implicit in the 
explanation of Lewontin's equations given in the last paragraph - the term O in those 
equations refers to populations of organisms, not to some individual orga ism. E rlier 
versions of DST (e.g: Oyama 2000, Gray 1992) and some of Lewontin's writings are 
sympathetic to this idea that there is a significant parallelism between the way 
populations of organisms and their environments reciprocally influence one anoth r 
and way in which individual organisms and their developmental environments do so. 
But this is not the place to give this idea the attention it deserves.  
 
The second way in which Odling-Smee's treatment differs from Lewontin's is that he is 
concerned not to represent the organism-environment system as a closed system, as the 
equations in the center column would seem to imply. Although the eucalypt-bus fir  
relationship, for example, is one of mutual construction, the change in this system over 
time is externally driven by the progressive drying of the Australian continental climate. 
Organisms feel the impact of changes in the environment in it's traditional sense of their 
total biotic and abiotic surroundings - but they experience these impacts via the 
environment as it appears in relation to them, and thus different lineages experience 
'the same changes' quite differently. Odling-Smee tries to respect this situation by 
assigning separate roles to the environment of a particular lineage of organisms and
what he calls the 'universal physical environment'. The former, organism-referent 
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description of the environment is the source of evolutionary pressures on that 
organism, and the organism is the source of niche-constructing forces on that 
environment. The latter, the universal physical environment, is a source of exogenous 
change in the organism's environment (See Brandon 1990 for a similar treatment of the 
concept of environment). 
 
The developmental systems model of evolution (Gray 1992; Griffiths & Gray 1994, 
1997) can be clarified and improved by the insights of Odling-Smee and his 
collaborators. In particular, the insight that exogenous factors can affect the availability 
of developmental resources has not been sufficiently stressed in previous presentations. 
There remains, however, one major difference between DST and work on niche-
construction up to and including the present time. Niche-constru tion is still a 
fundamentally dichotomous account of evolution (and, indeed, of development). There 
are two systems of heredity - genetic inheritance and environmental inheritance. There 
are, correspondingly, two causal processes in evolution - natural selection of the 
organism by the niche and construction of the niche by the organism. The niche-
construction model could be modified to take account of recent work on narrow 
epigenetic inheritance, with a category like 'intra-cellular inheritance' taking the place 
of genetic inheritance. This, however, would seem to merely substitute one rigid 
boundary for another. A central theme of the DST research tradition has been that 
distinctions between classes of developmental resource should be fluid and justified by 
particular research interests, rather than built into the basic framework of biological 
thought. Fundamentally, the unit of both development and evolution is the 
developmental system, the entire matrix of interactants involved in a life cycle. The 
developmental system is not two things, but one, albeit one that it can be divided up in 
many ways for different theoretical purposes. Hence we would interpret niche-
construction models 'tactically', as a method for rendering tractable some aspects of 
evolution. We would not interpret them 'strategically' as a fundamental representation 
of the nature of the evolutionary process.  
 
The DST model of evolution can be represented in such a way as to make it directly 
comparable with the models in Table 1.  We can aptly represent the developmental 
system with the symbol Œ. We retain Odling-Smee's insight that evolutionary change in 
organism-environment systems is often exogenously driven by using E to represent the 
universal physical (external) environment. We end up with the equation: 
 
dŒpop/dt = f (Œpop,E) 
  
Evolution is change in the nature of populations of developmental systems. This 
change is driven both endogenously, by the modification by each generation of 
developmental systems of the resources inherited by future generations, and 
exogenously, by modifications of these resources by factors outside the developmental 
system.  
 
5. Fitness and adaptation 
This representation of developmental systems evolution allows us to answer a 
persistent objection to DST. Since we claim that there is no distinction between 
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organism and environment, where do evolutionary pressures on the developmental 
system come from? What causes adaptation?3 To g ve a clear answer we must go back 
to the definition of the developmental system given in Griffiths & Gray (1994). The 
developmental system of an individual organism contains all the unique evens that ar
responsible for individual differences, deformities, and so forth. Just as a traditional 
model of evolution abstracts away from the unique features of individual phenotypes, 
developmental systems theory must abstract away from these features in ord r to 
tackle evolutionary questions.  In evolutionary terms the developmental system 
contains all those features which reliably recur in each generation and which help to 
reconstruct the normal life cycle of the evolving lineage. Of course, many species have 
more than one normal life cycle, either because there are different types of organism in 
a single evolving population, each reproducing its own differences (polymorphism) or 
because there are variations in the developmental matrix from one generation to the 
next (facultative development). For example, there are tall and short human families 
and heights also vary from one generation to another due to nutrition. These features 
are handled in the same way as in characterizations of 'the' phenotype of anevolving 
lineage (Griffiths & Gray 1997). The resultant description of the idealized 
developmental system of a particular lineage at some stage in its evolution is highly 
self-contained. Because the focus is on how the complete life cycle is achieved, 
everything needed for that life cycle is assumed to be present. So everything that 
impinges on the process is an element of the system itself. It is this that creates the 
impression that all change in the system must be endogenously driven and creates the 
apparent puzzle about the source of selection pressures. 
 
The puzzle is only apparent, because to think about evolution we need to switch from 
describing the developmental system characteristic of an evolving lineage at a time to 
describing an evolving population of individual developmental systems. We need to 
look at the causes of variation, as well as how the characteristics of the lineage are 
reliably reconstructed. Hence we need to look at the causes of idiosyncratic 
development in particular individuals. These causes lie 'outside' the description we have 
constructed of the typical developmental system of the lineage. A population of 
individual developmental systems will exhibit variation and differential reproduction for 
a number of reasons. Parental life cycles may fail to generate the full system of 
resources required to reconstruct the life cycle. Resources generated by the activities 
of an entire population (such as bushfires in eucalypt forest) may also be scarce, or 
patchily distributed, so that some individuals lack an important element of their 
developmental system. Finally, persistent resources - those d velopmental factors 
whose abundance is independent of the activities of the lineage, may be scarce or 
patchy and so some individuals may be unable to reestablish the relationship to these 
resources that is part of their life cycle. The external environment (E) can impinge on 
developmental systems by any of these routes. But this does not mean that we can go 
back to thinking of evolution as a response to the demands of the external 
environment. The effect of changes in the external environment on the evolution of a 
lineage can only be understood when those changes are described in terms of how they 
change the organism-referent environment (Epop). 'Changes' in parameters of the 
external environment which are developmentally equivalent are not changes from the 
point of view of the evolving system. People in different regions of Britain experience 
substantially different quantities of dissolved limestone in th ir drinking water, but this 
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is generally of no ecological significance. Conversely, apparently trivial changes may 
seem momentous when described in terms of a particular developmental system. Far 
smaller changes in the concentration of lead from one regi n t  another would have 
momentous consequences. This is, of course, the point already made by Lewontin, 
Odling-Smee and collaborators and Brandon (1990). 
 
So far we have concentrated on how failures of development can lead to evolutionarily 
significant variation. But positive innovations are possible as well. An individual 
difference in the system of developmental resources may allow some individuals to 
cope better when both are deprived of some developmental resource because of 
exogenous change. Alterna ively, an individual difference may simply alter the life 
cycle in such a way that it gives rise to a greater number of descendants. The source of 
novelty can be a mutation in any of the developmental resources -p rentally generated, 
population generated or independently persistent. To make this discussion more 
concrete, imagine a typical population of hermit crabs. A key component of the 
developmental system in this lineage is a succession of discarded shells of other 
species. A dearth of shells would be an exogenous cause of selective pressure on the 
lineage. Variants with a beneficial set of behaviors or a beneficial habitat association 
that allowed them to continue to reliably reestablish their relationships to shells would 
be favored by selection. Shells will typically be an independently persistent resource 
and the case in which an independently persistent developmental resource acts as a 
limiting resource has obvious resonance with traditional ideas of selection of the 
organism by an independent environment. But, to fictionalize the example slightly, 
suppose the crab life cycle includes disturbing the soil in such a way as to expose a 
greater supply of discarded shells. That would make shells a population-generated 
resource, but they might still act as a limiting resource. Or suppose a lineage evolves 
behaviors that allows crabs to bequeath shells to their offspring when they themselves 
seek a larger home. Shells would then be parentally generated, but exogenous change 
in the availability of shells might still leave some offspring without them, just as a 
shortage of a trace element in the parental diet may lead to a birth defect in a 
viviparous species.   
 
One factor that really is missing from this picture is the idea that the external (universal 
physical) environment poses definite problems that lineages must seek to solve. 
Instead, the lineage helps to define what the problems are. A dearth of shells is a 
feature of the ecological environment of a hermit crab and a problem for the hermit 
crab, but it is completely invisible to a blue-swimmer crab. The number of discarded 
shells per square meter is a feature of the external environment of both species, but it is 
only a feature of the ecological environment of one of them. So it is true that the 
developmental systems treatment of evolution does not incorporate Darwin's original, 
intuitive idea of fitness as a measure of the match between an organism and an 
independent environment (e.g: Darwin 1859/1964, p. 472). But this is a feature that 
the developmental systems treatment shares with conventional neo-Darwinism. 
Adaptation is no longer defined intuitively, as the sort of organism-environment 
relationship that a natural theologian would see as a sign of God's beneficent plan. 
Darwin set out to explain the fact that the biological world is full of adaptations in this 
sense, but as so often happens in science, the phenomenon to be explained got 
redefined in the process of explaining it. In modern usage, an adaptation is whatever 
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results from natural selection, eve  when what results is intuitively perverse and 
‘inefficient’.  
 
We hope it is now clear how DST can explain adaptation, in the modern sense of that 
term. Change over time in the developmental system of a lineage is driven by the 
differing capacity of variant developmental systems to reconstruct themselves, or, in a 
word, differential fitness. What is fitness? In contemporary evolutionary theory fitness 
is a measure of the capacity of a unit of evolution to reproduce itself (Mills & Beatty 
1979). Fitness differences are caused by physical and behavioral differences between 
the individuals in the population. So fitness can be translated on a case-by-case basis 
into a detailed causal explanation of evolutionary success. Fitness in general, however, 
does not correspond to any single physical property (Rosenberg 1978). The only 
general account of fitness describes its role as a parameter in population dynamic 
equations. It is clear that this orthodox account of fitness applies equally well to the 
developmental systems theory. There is no puzzle about how developmental systems 
that incorporate the whole range of resources that reconstruct the life cycle could 
come to vary in their success in reconstructing themselves and be selected on that 
basis. 
 
6. Individuals, lineages and the units of evolution  
A coherent theory of evolution requires an accurate conception of its fundamental 
units.  According to DST an evolutionary individual is one cycle of a complete 
developmental process - a life cycle. We have shown that natural selection can act on 
populations of developmental systems and give rise to adaptation, but in doing so we 
have assumed that developmental systems are the sort of things that can be counted, 
that they have clear boundaries and that they do not ov rlap so much that they cannot 
be distinguished from one another. We now turn to justifying this assumption.  
Developmental systems include much that is outside the traditional phenotype. This 
raises the question of where one developmental system and one lif  cycle ends and the 
next begins There is an enormous amount of cyclical structure in most biological 
lineages.  As well as the life cycles associated with traditional physiological individuals 
there are 'repeated assemblies' (Caporael 1995) within a single individual, such as cells 
or morphological parts like the leaves of a tree. There are also repeated assemblies of 
whole individual organisms, such as lichens or ant-acacia symbioses. In previous 
publications we have tried to identify what makes a repeted ass mbly a developmental 
system in its own right, as opposed to a part of such a system or an aggregate of 
several different systems (see especially Griffiths & Gray 1997). While we still see 
some merit in our previous suggestions, we have learnt a great deal from the work of 
David Sloan Wilson and Elliott Sober on trait-group selection, and also from Kim 
Sterelny's work on higher level selection (Sober & Wilson 1994, 1998; Sterelny 1996; 
Wilson 1997; Wilson & Sober 1994; 1998). 
 
Wilson and Sober’s work centers on the idea of a trait group - a set of organisms 
relative to which some adaptation is, in economic terms, a public good. The beavers 
that share a lodge form a trait group with respect to dam-building daptations because 
it is not possible for one beaver to increase its fitness by dam building without 
increasing the fitness of its lodge mates. Wilson and Sober argue that trait groups are 
units of evolution. That is to say, it makes sense to assign fitnesses to trait groups and 
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to track the evoluti n of adaptations due to the differential reproduction of their 
associated replicators. But the emergence of a new level of evolutionary individuality 
seems to require more than this. The emergence of communal living in the beaver 
lineage, or of a symbiotic association between ant lineages and acacia lineages does not 
mark the same sort of fundamental transition as occurred with the origin of the 
eukaryote cell, the emergence of multicellularity or the evolution of eusociality in 
social insects. Not every trait group is a ‘superorganism’. There are a number of 
features that seem to mark the difference between mere trait groups and 
superorganisms, such as the functional differentiation of parts and the dependence of 
parts on the whole for their viability. Sterelny and Griffiths have argued that the 
fundamental feature of a superorganism is that many traits of the component organisms 
are selected with respect to the very same trait group (Sterelny & Griffiths 1999, pp. 
172-177; see also Wilson 1997). The ants in  nest and the cells in a human body have 
a shared fate not just with respect to one part of their activities, but with respect to all 
of them. A liver cell does not have some adaptations with respect to the whole body 
and other with respect to the liver alon . This is because the only way the liver cell can 
reproduce itself is via the success of the whole organism. Similarly, the only way an ant 
can contribute to its own reproduction is via the success of the nest as a whole. This 
broad congruence of interests results from evolved features that suppress competition 
between the component parts of the superorganism. The best known of these is the 
segregation of the germ line. However, it is easy to overstate the importance of this 
particular mechanism. Plants typically do not have germ-line segregation, so it cannot 
be a prerequisite for complex multicellular life. Leo Buss has explored some of the 
very different mechanisms that are used to bind the interests of cell-lineages tog ther in 
plants and fungi (Buss 1987). Again, in bee nests, the queen marks her eggs with a 
pheromone that inhibits workers from eating them. Eggs laid by workers are eaten by 
other workers, so the only realistic way for workers to bring about the reconstruction 
of their life cycle is via the larger, colony life cycle (Ratnieks & Visscher 1989). The 
worker bee is reduced to a part of a larger cycle as effectively as a metazoan cell is 
reduced to a part by segregation of the germ line. 
 
We suggest, then, that a repeated assembly is a developmental system in its own right, 
as opposed to a part of such a system or an aggregate of several different systems 
when specific adaptations exist, presumably due to trait group selection, which 
suppress competition between the separate components of the assembly.  This account 
of the evolution of individuality can actually explain why the distinction between a 
colony of organisms or a symbiotic association and an individual organism is not a 
sharp one. The mechanisms that bind the trait group together can be mor  or less 
effective. They may also keep the evolutionary interests of the same group aligned 
across a wider or narrower range of traits. The metazoan organism and the unicellular 
eukaryotic cell are clearly individuals. Jellyfish, lichens, eusocial ins ct colonies and the 
ant-acacia symbiosis are progressively less clearly individuals. Each has a life cycle and 
a developmental system that feeds into its development. But in most of these latter 
cases, it is possible to describe evolutionary pressures with respect to which the smaller 
life cycles nested within the larger cycle do not form a trait group. The more forced 
and implausible these scenarios, the less theoretical role there is for a description in 
which these cycles are treated as independe t and not as parts.  
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7. Building Bridges: The complementary programs of DST and EDB 
At the end of a well-known paper on adaptation, Lewontin (1978) notes that adaptive 
evolution requires quasi-independence: selection must be able to act on a trait without 
causing deleterious changes in other aspects of the organism. If all the features of an 
organism were so closely developmentally integrated that quasi-independent variation 
did not exist, then "organisms as we know them could not exist because adaptive 
evolution would have been impossible" (Lewontin 1978, p.169). The requirement for 
quasi- ndependence means that we must add a caveat to the slogan that "Nature selects 
for outcomes" and not for how those outcomes are produced (Lehrman 1970, p. 28). 
The reliable reoccurrence of an advantageous variant is not enough. The 
developmental process that produces the variation must be quasi-independent 
(modular) if it is to be the basis for cumulative selection. There has been considerable 
recent interest in the extent to which the organization of development really is 
modular. Günther Wagner and Lee Altenberg (1996) suggest that directional selection 
might act on developmental systems to reduce pleiotropic effects between characters 
with different functions, thereby nhancing the modularity and evolvability of these 
developmental systems. They speculate that there should be evolutionary trends 
towards increased modularity. Brandon (1999) goes so far as to suggest that 
developmental modules at each level of in the evolutionary hierarchy and are the units 
of selection at that level. The study of developmental modularity is still in its infancy 
and the extent of that modularity far from resolved. However, it is clear that 
understanding the extent and nature of developmental m dularity is an essential to 
understanding how evolution actually unfolds - a d has unfolded - in practice.  
 
The modularity issue is at the heart of the new discipline of developmental 
evolutionary biology (EDB), so it is striking that DST has had little to say about the 
issue of modularity, or the older, related issue of the extent of developmental 
constraints (Maynard Smith et al 1985, for an exception to this remark, see Oyama 
1992). What, one might ask, is developmental about developmental systems th ory? 
The answer is that the term ‘developmental’ in this context stands in contrast to 
‘innate’. To think developmentally is to focus on the many factors that must be present 
for a fertilized egg to give rise to a normal life cycle and on the process - dev lopm nt 
- in which those factors interact. Whereas EDB stems from the impact of the molecular 
revolution on developmental biology and comparative morphology, DST grew out of 
the continued efforts of developmental psychobiologists to resist the idea that evolved 
features of mind and behavior are outside the sphere of developmental psychology 
because they are programmed in the genes and so do not have a evelopmental 
psychology. Most developmental systems theorists trace their intellectual ancestry to 
Daniel S. Lehrman’s 1953 ‘Critique of Konrad Lorenz's theory of instinctive behavior’ 
and to the work in comparative psychology reflected in that critique (Johnston 2001; 
Gottlieb 2001). Research in the developmental systems tradition has thus had a strong 
emphasis on demonstrating the contingency of developmental outcomes on extra-
genetic factors and, latterly, demonstrating the evolutionary potential of those factors. 
From this perspective, to understand their development is to understand how each 
stage of the developing organism interacts with its environment to give rise to the next. 
DST, with its emphasis on the life cycle in place of the adult phenotype and on the role 
of extra-genetic inheritance is an attempt to provide a general conception of 
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development and evolution in the spirit of this research tradition of developmental 
psychobiology4. 
 
In stark contrast, much of the criticism directed by developmental morphologists at 
conventional neo-Darwinism has emphasized, not the contingency of developmental, 
but its fixity. The literature on ‘developmental constraints’ suggests that some aspects 
of phenotypes are too strongly integrated to be altered by natural selection acting on 
the genes, let alone by natural selection manipulating non-genetic developmental 
parameters! In recent years, however, EBD has been able to move beyond treating 
development as a set of constraints on selection, in part because of conceptual 
advances and in part because technical advances have made it possible to elucidate 
developmental ‘constraints’ mechanistically and not merely describe them 
phenomenologically on the basis of gaps in the comparative data  
 
In our view, these two critiques of earlier evolutionary thought are essentially 
complimentary. DST does not provide a theory of phenotypic integration and modular 
evolution, but rather stands in need of one, and EDB is beginning to supply such a 
theory. Conversely, nothing in the fundamental ideas of EDB excludes applying that 
theory to a wider conception of the developmental system, not a  emerging from 
interactions between genes, but as emerging from interactions between the whole 
matrix of resources that are required for development. In fact, the need to extend the 
research agenda of EBD in this manner has been recognized in reent calls for greater 
attention to the ecological context of development and the developmental basis of 
phenotypic plasticity (Sultan, 1992; Schlichting and Pigliucci 1998; Gilbert 2000; this 
volume). Research under the banner of ‘phenotypic plasticity’ has emphasized the fact 
that the environment plays an informative, not merely a supporting, role in 
development. For understandable reasons, however, the emphasis of research on 
phenotypic plasticity has been on adaptive plasticity. Organisms have evolved to use 
the environment as a source of information for the deployment of facultative 
adaptations. DST can enrich this perspective by emphasizing that the dependence of 
development on the ecological context is a fundamental feature, not a last flourish of 
adapted complexity. EBD recognizes that the nature of development explains the 
nature of evolution as much as evolution explains the nature of development. In the 
same way, the fact that what changes over evolutionary time are organism-
environment systems is an essential part of any adequate theory of adaptive evolution. 
‘Ecological developmental biology’ is not merely a framework for studying adaptive 
plasticity, it is a fundamentally better, more inclusive way of approaching the evolution 
of development and the implications of development for evolutionary theory.  
 
The ubiquity of environmental effects on development can be nicely illustrated using 
neuroscientist Terence Deacon’s concept of ‘addiction to the environment’ (Deacon 
1997). During primate evolution, an abundance of dietary vitamin C caused the loss of 
the normal mammalian pathway for ascorbic acid synthesis (Jukes and King 1975). 
Because this vital developmental resource could be inherited passively, rather than via 
the genes previously involved in its synthesis, the primate lineage became dependent on 
(‘addicted to’) this form of extra-genetic inheritance. In the same way, hermit crabs are 
‘addicted’ to discarded shells and almost all large organisms are ‘addicted’ to the 
earth’s gravity. In fact, evolved lineages are ‘addicted’ to innumerable aspects of the 
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environment with which they have coevolved, although most of these aspects are 
reproduced so reliably that this does not give rise to significant variation, and so is 
overlooked. Nevertheless, any account of how organisms develop that neglects these 
factors, and the evolutionary processes that led to their incorporation in development, 
is seriously incomplete. 
 
8. Conclusion 
DST yields a representation of evolution that is quite capable of accommodating the 
traditional themes of natural selection and also the new results that are emerging from 
evolutionary developmental biology. But it adds something unique - a framework for 
thinking about development and evolution without the distorting dichotomization of 
biological processes into gene and non-gene and the vestiges of the ‘black-boxing’ of 
developmental processes in the modern synthesis, such as the asymmetric use of the 
concept of information. Phenomena that are marginalized in current gene-centic 
conceptions, such as extra-genetic inheritance, niche construction and phenotypic 
plasticity are placed center stage.  
 
 
Endnotes 
 
* To appear ina volume provisionally titledTh  Evolutionary Biology of Complex 
Phenotypes dited by Massimo Pigliucci and Katherine Preston, OUP. 
 
1. Here is a random selection: "Evolution 1. Process by which organisms come to 
differ from generation to generation. 2. Change in the gene pool of a population from 
generation to generation." (Arms & Camp 1987, p. 1121). "Evolution is the result of 
accumulated changes in the composition of the gene pool." (Curtis & Barnes 1989, p. 
989). 
 
2. DST is an attempt to sum up the ideas of a research tradition in developmental 
psychobiology that goes back at least to Daniel Lehrman’s work in the 1950s (Johnson 
2001, Gottlieb 2001). Robert, Hall and Olson (2001) set out to compare DST with the 
more gene-centered ideas of contemporary evolutionary developmental biology (EBD) 
but they miss the fact that DST has its roots in developmental psychobiology. They 
note that “EBD has yet to draw extensively from behavior/psychology” (p 958) and 
cite the work of Gilbert Gottlieb as an exception. But Gottlieb, of course, is one of the 
seminal figures in DST and his ‘developmental- sychobiological systems view’ is quite 
unlike most work in EBD because it stresses the roles in d ve opment of highly 
structured, species-specific environments and of extra-genetic inheritance. As 
developmental psychologists David Bjorklund and Anthony Pellegrini state in their 
recent book on evolutionary developmental psychology, “In this book we adopt a 
specific model, the developmental systems approach (Gottlieb 2000; Oyama 2000a)... 
strengthening considerably, we believe, evolutionary psychologists’ arguments that 
genes are not necessarily destiny” (Bjorklund & Pellegrini 2002). It is encouraging to 
see that the tradition represented by Gottlieb and Oyama has received increased 
attention in the last few years. It has been embodied in a textbook by George Michel 
and Celia Moore (1995) and popularized by authors like David Moore (2001; see also 
Bateson and Martin 1999). Much of our own work has been designed to demonstrate 
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the relevance of DST concepts outside their original home in the study of behavioral 
development. DST may still be ‘virtually unknown among biologists’ (Robert et al 
954), if this means biologists working on the evolutionary developmental biology of 
morphological structures, but as calls for an ‘ecological developmental biology’ 
suggest, those biologists could learn much from the tradition of developmental 
psychobiology. 
 
3. We are not aware of any published version of this criticism, but it was first 
suggested to Griffiths in conversation by Lindley Darden in 1994 and has also been 
raised by Alexander Rosenberg (personal communication).  
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